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Jagdish, Son of Ahmad: Dalit
Religion and Nominative Politics in
Lucknow
Joel Lee
‘We were Lal Begis. Then when Congress came to
power we became Valmiki’—Daulat Ram (son of
Anwar).1
‘The profit that accrued to us upon becoming
Hindu [Hindu ban karke], well, it was myriad: many
kinds of benefits and schemes, as well as political
gains and economic improvement’—Ratan Lal
‘Sadhu’ (son of Ali).
1 In 1947, members of the caste that supplied most of Lucknow’s sanitation labour neither
referred to themselves as Valmiki nor were referred to by others as such. As Lalta Prasad,
born in 1923, put it to me, ‘In my childhood we were all Lal Begis. When I was eight, ten,
twelve years old, there was not even mention of the name Valmiki.’  The Lal Begis of
Lucknow and nearby districts, like their caste fellows across the subcontinent who were
variously called Bhangi, Chuhra, Mehtar, and Halalkhor, nurtured a tradition of beliefs
and practices centred on a prophet named Lal Beg, from whom they derived their title.
The Lucknow Lal  Begis had,  in 1947,  predominantly musalmānā  nām,  that is,  personal
names in a Muslim style:  female names like Rukhsana, Nazira,  and Allah Rakhi;  male
names like Nabbu, Ramzanu, and Anwar.
2 When I conducted ethnographic and archival research in Lucknow a little over 60 years
later, in 2011–12, I met not a single person who referred to himself or herself as Lal Begi—
at least not initially,  and not in mixed company. Most men and many women in the
community called themselves Valmiki (or Balmiki, with significance rarely attached to
the variation in pronunciation or spelling). Valmiki was also the prevailing term used by
others to denote the sanitation labour castes. And in terms of personal names, hinduānā
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nām—names in a Hindu style—predominated: female names like Shanti, Sunita and Asha;
male names like Ganesh, Vinod, and Ram Kumar. If one were to assume—as is normatively
and consequentially done by everyone from journalists to political scientists to census
enumerators—that personal names function as transparent indices of religious identity,
then  the  current  generation  would  appear  to  be  of  an  entirely  different  religious
community than their grandparents were at the time of Indian independence.
3 How did this  transpire? How did a community come to radically alter its  traditional
nominative practices,  replacing an Islamicate repertoire of names with a brahminical
one? What role did the state play in this act of mass resignification, and what does the
Lucknow story tell us about related processes that took place elsewhere in north India?
Before explaining how this article will address these questions, let me briefly sketch the
historical significance of our subject and its scholarly treatment to date.
4 As current controversies over both the ‘ghar vāpsī’ campaigns of the Hindu right and the
conversions  of  Valmikis  to  Islam in  Uttar  Pradesh (e.g.,  The  Hindu 2015,  Tiwari  and
Abbas 2015) remind us, the question of the religious affiliation of the sanitation labour
castes has long been perceived as a matter of high stakes—not only for the immediate
actors involved, but for the nation. The historical reasons for this are clear enough: with
the growth of representative bodies in the initial decades of the 20th century, that fifth of
the  people  of  South  Asia  then  known  as  ‘untouchables’  and  Depressed  Classes  was
transformed, for the first time in history, into an enumerated community (Kaviraj 1992)
whose vast numbers made it the decisive factor in the determination of whether India
had  a  Hindu  majority  or  not.  As  the  Arya  Samaj  and  Congress  leader  Swami
Shraddhanand pithily put it in the early 1920s, ‘If all untouchables became Muslims then
these will become equal to the Hindus, and at the time of independence they will not
depend on the Hindus, but will be able to stand on their own legs’ (Jordens 1981: 141). To
this  terrifying prospect there was only one solution:  ‘their  assimilation in the Hindu
polity is the very plinth on which alone the edifice of free India can be constructed’
(Jordens  1981: 163).  The  rancorous  debate  between  the  Muslim  League,  Congress,
‘untouchable’ leaders and the colonial administration over how the Depressed Classes
should be categorized in terms of religion is a story that remains largely obscured in the
historiography of the period until the moment of its ‘resolution,’ the Poona Pact of 1932,
in which Gandhi wrested from the colonial state governmental approval of his discursive
framing  of  untouchability  as  a  problem  internal  to  Hindu  society  and  thus  of
‘untouchables’  as  Hindu.2 While  this  framing  ushered  in  a  new  governmental  and
sociological commonsense—the same commonsense that remains with us today—it did
not quell the anxiety that Dalit religious autonomy provoked, and continues to provoke,
in a broad spectrum of Indian nationalist thought and practice.
5 If  nothing short  of  the  existence of  a  Hindu majority  rests  on the question of  Dalit
religion, within the Dalit population the sanitation labour castes have historically played
a unique role both in the struggle over this question and in its representation. There are
multiple reasons for this, including the numerical preponderance of the sanitation labour
castes in regions of intense interreligious competition: in some districts of Punjab they
constituted  more  than  ten  percent  of  the  overall  population  in  the  colonial  period
(Ibbetson 1970: 290–92). Also significant is the trans-regional spread of the most populous
of the sanitation labour castes: unlike most Dalit castes, which were largely confined to
particular linguistic regions, the labour migrations of the Chuhra caste under Mughal,
Maratha and British dispensations brought them in numbers to cities and cantonments
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from Karachi to Calcutta and Amritsar to Hyderabad. Their being the most pan-Indian of
the Depressed Classes, alongside the nature of their labour in the city, made them highly
visible to a nationalist elite newly concerned with the ‘untouchable’  problem. Gandhi
further heightened this visibility by presenting the sanitation labour castes—whom he
referred to as Bhangis—as a synecdoche for all of the Depressed Classes (Zelliot 1998: 155,
Prashad 1996: 552).  Indeed, so large did the sanitation labour castes loom in Gandhi’s
representation of the caste question that the number of references to ‘Bhangi’  in his
collected writings and speeches is higher than the number of references to Chamar, Dhed,
Mahar, Mala, Paraiyar/Pariah (to name a few prominent Dalit castes), Rajput, Baniya, and
Shudra combined.3
6 Thus, in terms both of the actual numbers of the sanitation labour castes and of their
prominence in the nationalist imagination, the stakes of the contest over their religious
identity were high. Relative to its historical and contemporary importance, this contest—
a  century-old,  ongoing  series  of  interlocking  struggles  over  names,  practices  and
ideologies,  spread across the subcontinent, into which our story of mass renaming in
Lucknow is an illuminating entry point—has attracted little scholarly attention. The few
existing  accounts  make  sense  of  the  rise  of  the  Valmiki  title  and  claims  of  Hindu
belonging in one of three ways. First there are scholars in religious studies who have
sought to explain the puzzling link between the sanitation labour caste and the putative
author of the Sanskrit Ramayana, whose impeccable Brahmin lineage is multiply attested
within the epic, by tracking the name Valmiki through a range of Sanskrit and vernacular
religious  texts  (Sahdev 1997,  Leslie 2003).  While  these  accounts  do  not  address  the
modern period in which the link was actually forged, they make the significant discovery
that there have been many Valmikis—the literary traditions of South Asia feature at least
seven distinct figures by this name—which helps to explain the context in which Arya
Samaj activists were able, in the early 20th century, to conflate a magician and swineherd
of Dalit oral tradition with the Sanskrit poet of high brahminical tradition. A different
approach is taken by Bhagwan Das (1973) and Vijay Prashad (2000), who emphasize that
the adoption of Valmiki is a 20th century phenomenon and describe the process as ‘Hindu
becoming’  (Hindu  bannā)  and  ‘Hinduization,’  respectively.  The  third  set  of  accounts
characterizes the same process as one of ‘Sanskritization,’ M.N. Srinivas’s term for the
attempt by subordinated castes to improve their social status by adopting the cultural
practices  of  the  privileged  castes  (Shyamlal 1984,  Jaoul 2011,  O’Brien  2012: 193–94).
Nicolas Jaoul, though, modifies the concept considerably in his rich ethnography of the
conflict  over Valmiki  in Kanpur;  what he finds is  an ‘institutionalised and politically
engineered  Sanskritisation  rather  than  the  kind  of cultural  spontaneity  with  which
Sanskritisation is usually equated’ (Jaoul 2011: 280).
7 In conversation with these accounts, I will describe in this article moments in the contest
over the religious identity of the sanitation labour castes as it transpired in Lucknow in
the middle decades of the 20th century. Of the many loci of change I will foreground
transnomination—the renaming of persons using hinduānā rather than musalmānā names
—because it throws into relief three highly consequential aspects of the transformation of
the sanitation labour castes that are absent or understated in the existing studies. First,
to  focus  on  naming  practices  is  to  glimpse  the  stark  alterity  that  characterized  the
sanitation  labour  castes’  self-understanding  vis-à-vis  Hindus  prior  to  the  Valmiki
movement. This, as I will elaborate shortly, is why our subject does not conform to even a
modified version of the Sanskritization model. Second, the circumstances under which
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most Lal Begis in Lucknow were renamed points to hitherto unexamined dimensions of
political engineering. While Prashad emphasizes the role of Hindu municipal officials in
Delhi and Jaoul demonstrates that state-level Congress politicians in UP also worked to
promote the Valmiki  movement,  my findings  reveal  that  in collaboration with these
government actors, the Hinduizing cause was given a decisive impetus by the national
level Congress administration in the form of its Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of
1950. Third, the sweeping success of the effort to transform naming practices in Lucknow,
when compared to the fierce and ongoing internal controversies over other aspects of the
Valmiki movement (e.g., whether to venerate Lal Beg or Valmiki, how to conduct life cycle
rituals, what degree of intimacy to maintain with Muslim neighbours), suggests that for
much of the community, there is a politics of tactical dissimulation at work: appearing to
accept  the  offer  of  majoritarian  inclusion,  while  retaining,  with  varying  degrees  of
secrecy,  autonomous  traditions.  Here  the  Lucknow  material  provides  an  important
counterexample to studies in which Dalits, and in particular urban Valmikis, are enrolled
in  projects  of  Hindu  majoritarian  violence  (Prashad 2000,  Narayana 2009,  Jaoul 2011).
Analytically isolating transnomination from other aspects of the contest over religious
identity enables us to question whether the nominative Hinduization of the sanitation
labour castes constitutes the Hindu majoritarian triumph that it appears to be.
8 Before turning to our main narrative—how the Lal Begis of Lucknow became Valmikis—a
few matters  remain  to  be  clarified.  In  the  next  section,  after briefly  explaining  my
disquiet  with  the  Sanskritization  model,  I  will  consider  one  of  the  earliest  critical
assessments  of  the  Valmiki  movement—Ambedkar’s—and  relate  it  to  the  regime  of
recognition that the Poona Pact of 1932 put in place and that the Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order of 1950 chiselled into law. This is necessary in order to understand the
decisions  Lucknow Lal  Begis  made  in  the  following  decades.  The  subsequent  section
introduces the sanitation labour castes of Lucknow in more detail.
 
Recognition in the New Regime
9 Nicolas  Jaoul’s  formulation  of  the  adoption  of  Valmiki  as  ‘politically  engineered
Sanskrisation’ is salutary in that it both draws our attention to the political content of the
particular  history  in  which  we  are  interested  and  politicizes  the  concept  of
Sanskritization  more  generally.  At  the  same  time,  though,  the  culturalist  frame  of
Sanskritization that Jaoul rightly criticizes is not the concept’s only problem.4 Equally
fatal in the Dalit context is that Sanskritization, like Dumont’s ‘whole’ and Alfred Lyall’s
organic  model  of  Hinduism,  plots  all  of  subaltern  religious  life  into  a  brahminical
narrative.  This  is  erroneous:  neither  is  brahminical  Hinduism  a  necessary  telos  of
subaltern religiosity—as the social history of vast communities like Jats and Julahas will
confirm5—nor does it inevitably pervade the ‘tribal’ context that such narratives take as
their  starting  point.  On  the  contrary,  the  assumption,  implicit  in  many  uses  of  the
concept of Sanskritization, that before their efforts at upward mobility, subaltern groups
lived in a kind of transhistorical, proto-Hindu condition—that they were waiting in the
wings of Hinduism, as it  were—is a clear case of  the backward projection of  modern
categories, a projection that does violence to the self-representations of at least some of
these groups. The Lal Begis, as we will see, were among those who gave voice to their
alterity from the Hindus before the campaign to adopt Valmiki became popular. For this
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reason,  Sanskritization,  insofar as it  implies upward movement within,  rather than a
rupture of religious boundaries, is not a fit concept for the phenomenon at hand.
10 It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind that  the  common-sense that  imagines  the subaltern
communities of South Asian history to have been Hindu or proto-Hindu by default was
not securely in place in the early decades of the 20th century. In the period before the
Poona Pact, the religious ‘identity’ of the Depressed Classes was by no means a settled
question,  and it  remained a  possibility,  however  slight,  that  the  colonial  state  could
confer recognition on the de facto autonomy of the various religious communities that
caste  subalterns  understood  themselves  to  constitute,  as  it  did,  briefly,  with  the  Ad
Dharmis in the 1931 census (Juergensmeyer 2009). This prospect died, however, in the
wake of  Gandhi’s  ‘epic  fast’  against  the  communal  award;  the  Poona Pact  politically
ratified the discursive confinement of the Depressed Classes within the category of the
Hindu  (Tejani 2007,  Conrad 2007,  Adcock 2014).  As  Gandhi  triumphantly  put  it  to
Ambedkar in February 1933, ‘In accepting the Poona Pact you accept the position that you
are Hindus […] You cannot escape the situation that you are Hindus in spite of your
statement to the contrary’ (Gandhi 2000: vol. 59, Appendix X).
11 If the Poona Pact framed the terms of a new regime of recognition, it did not abolish the
old common-sense overnight, and traces of the preceding state of affairs remained even
in governmental practice. There were Muslim and Sikh castes listed among the colonial
government’s  first  ‘schedule’  of  1936,  for instance.  Upon independence,  however,  the
Congress eliminated these contradictions. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of
1950 unequivocally stated that ‘no person who professes a religion different from the
Hindu religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.’ Combined with the
raft of political safeguards and economic and educational benefits that the Constitution
and subsequent legislation made available to Scheduled Castes, this religious restriction
on state recognition of disadvantaged status worked, in effect, as a national governmental
incentive to ‘profess’ the Hindu religion. As we will see, its consequences in Lucknow
were considerable.
12 Ambedkar’s  assessment  of  the  Valmiki  movement—one  of  the  earliest—reflects  the
discursive imprisonment of  the ‘untouchable’  within the house of  Hinduism that  the
Poona Pact helped bring about. In his essay ‘Away from the Hindus,’ written in the years
following the Poona Pact, Ambedkar wrote the following:
There is  a  general  attempt [by Untouchables]  to  call  themselves  by some name
other than the ‘Untouchables’ [...] the Bhangis call themselves Balmikis. All of them
if  away  from  their  localities  would  call  themselves  Christians  […]  they  give
themselves  other  names  which  may  be  likened  to  the  process  of  undergoing
protective discolouration […]
The name matters and matters a great deal. For, the name can make a revolution in
the status of the Untouchables. But the name must be the name of a community
outside Hinduism and beyond its power of spoliation and degradation. Such name
can be the property of the Untouchable only if they undergo religious conversion. A
conversion by change of name within Hinduism is a clandestine conversion which
can be of no avail (Ambedkar 1989: 419–20).
13 In judging the adoption of Valmiki as a ‘change of name within Hinduism,’ Ambedkar
implies that the ‘Bhangis’  were ‘within Hinduism’ in the first  place.  Whether he was
aware of  the degree to which the sanitation labour castes of  north India understood
themselves  to  constitute  a  distinct  religious  community  is  difficult  to  know.  But  to
whatever extent he was acquainted with the traditions of Lal Beg, in the passage quoted
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Ambedkar  cedes  the  ground  that  Gandhi  so  keenly  sought  him  to  cede:  that  the
‘untouchables’ are to be considered Hindu by default. Deprived of a political discourse
that  would  recognize  the  autonomy  of  already  existing  Dalit  religious  traditions,
Ambedkar had by this time committed himself to an emancipatory project that accepted
the terms of the categorical schema installed by the Poona Pact as a starting point—he
acquiesced  to  being  defined  as  Hindu6—but  sought  to  escape  this  confinement  by
conversion.
14 Given this context, it is unsurprising that Ambedkar gives a negative view of the adoption
of Valmiki as ineffectual or even damaging as a means of ‘untouchable’ emancipation. On
another  occasion  Ambedkar  is  reported  to  have  said  that  ‘Valmiki  is  a one-man
advertising agency for Ram Rajya’  (Prashad 2000: 154).  For our purposes,  Ambedkar’s
assessment of the politics of the sanitation labour castes is important for an additional
reason. His characterization of their adoption of new names as ‘undertaking protective
discolouration’ perceptively suggests a theme in evidence in the identitarian struggle in
Lucknow. Throughout the colonial period the sanitation labour castes were described as
‘chameleon-like in their copying of the externals of other faiths’ (Griswold 1934: 227; cf.
Strickler 1926, Rose 1902, Burn 1902). The oral traditions of the community valorise the
subaltern  tactic  of  dissimulation,  particularly  in  the  domain  of  religious  practice:
appearing  to  conform  to  the  religious  norms  of  political  overlords  while  discreetly
maintaining autonomous rites. This kind of furtive politics did not end in the colonial
period but perdures in my interlocutors’ stories of the post-independence period, as well
as in silences, smiles, gestures, and other non-verbal signs. In flagging this dimension of
the  sanitation  labour  castes’  apparent  embrace  of  Valmiki,  then,  Ambedkar,  unlike
subsequent observers of the same process, alerts us to that which makes the Lucknow
story so distinctive. His evocative phrase ‘clandestine conversion’ is thus both accurate
and misleading: the adoption of Valmiki was indeed a ‘conversion’ of sorts—a donning of
the mantle of a new religion. But it was not the claiming of Hindu identity that was
‘clandestine’—this took place rather out in the open. What was ‘clandestine’ was not the
embrace of Valmiki but the retention—in back rooms, away from the reformist gaze—of
the old, non-Hindu ways of Lal Begi ancestors.
 
The Sanitation Labour Castes, Lal Beg, and the 583
15 But what was this Lal Begi tradition, what kind of religious community did it imagine, and
to what extent were the practices of the sanitation labour castes of the Lucknow region
distinctive from those of their caste fellows elsewhere in the subcontinent?
16 First  I  should  separate  out  terms  in  what  is  a  very  dense  and  complex  field  of
nomenclature. The protagonists of our story have been known by a welter of names: titles
of specific castes (Chuhra, Dom, Dhanuk, Hela, Bansphor, and others), occupational labels
that  transcend  caste  specificity  (Khakrob,  Halalkhor,  Jamadar,  Mehtar,  sweeper,
scavenger), religious titles that come to connote caste belonging (Lal Begi, Valmiki), and
the hotly contested appellation ‘Bhangi.’ By ‘sanitation labour castes’ I mean to denote all
of the preceding: those Dalit castes that perform the vast majority of sanitation work in
contemporary  South  Asia.  The  term  is  a  translation  of  safāī  kāmgār  jātiyāṅ,  a  self-
designation used by ordinary people, by Hindi writers who take up the topic, and by a
number of non-governmental organizations whose members belong to these castes. By
using the term I do not mean to endorse or reproduce the brahminical social ideology
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that  reifies  the  contingent  link  between  a  people  and  an  occupation—a  concern
thoughtfully raised by Ramnarayan Rawat (2011)—but rather to acknowledge, with my
interlocutors, the extraordinary degree to which this domain of work impinges on their
lives.
17 Songs, stories, rites and practices related to Lal Beg constitute one sphere in which the
distinct sanitation labour castes appear to have found common ground. It is not clear to
what  extent  all  of  the  castes  participated—Chuhras  and Dhanuks  certainly  did  (Rose
1902: 183–86, Strickler 1926, Ibbetson 1970: 294–96), whereas Doms may not have—but to
many observers the veneration of Lal Beg appeared so widespread across regions and
communities that the title Lal Begi, meaning disciple of Lal Beg, was used as a synonym
for sweeper (e.g., Fallon 1879: 303, Dihlawi 1898: 165, Azad 1907: 394, Kipling 1901: 158–
59).  In  oral  traditions  recorded  by  missionaries,  folklorists,  administrators  and
ethnologists in Punjab, Bengal, the Deccan and the United Provinces in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, Lal Beg (literally ‘Red Lord’), also known as Bala Shah, was a prophet
(nabi, paighambar) and guru created by god (alif allah, khuda, rabb, akal purakh) who lived
among the sanitation labour castes and secured their salvation in the afterlife. In songs
and legends Lal  Beg is  miraculously born from a pot in Ghazni,  eats bread baked by
Fatima, wins praise from ‘Ali, sweeps the steps of heaven (bihisht), rescues the sweepers of
Delhi from an enraged emperor, drives camels in Kashmir, conquers Kabul, and generally
leads an extraordinary life (Ibbetson 1970, Temple 1884A, 1884B, Greeven 1894, Youngson
1906: 340–54,  Kaul  1911: 131–33,  Strickler  1926: Ch 3).  To  the  extent  that  there  are
historical referents in the corpus of Lal Begi oral traditions, they are largely Mughal; the
theological vocabulary is heavily Islamic, though Sikh terms and concepts also appear.
18 How did the Lal Begis perceive themselves vis-à-vis other religious communities? The oral
traditions suggest a community that understood itself as other to Hindus, Muslims, and
Sikhs.  Lal  Begi  liturgical  songs  transcribed  in  the  late  colonial  period  have  as  one
remarkable feature usages of the terms Hindu and Muslim as contrastive to the Lal Begi
self. Some of these usages relate to the shrines of Lal Beg, which are affirmed as distinct
from the religious architecture of other communities. One of the songs performed at the
annual feast of Lal Beg in Benares, for instance, contains the line ‘The Hindu has his
temple, the Muslim his mosque, but I give to you this altar of mud’ (Greeven 1894: 43, 48).7
Another song, transcribed in Punjab, presents a similar sentiment: ‘As Hindus revere the
Ganga, as Muslims have their Mecca, so the Shahis [another name for Lal Begis] adore
your name and build your shrines in every village’ (Youngson 1906: 343).8 In these verses,
the Lal Beg shrine is contrasted with its correlates in the religious communities of others.
19 Some of the clearest assertions of Lal Begi difference from other religious communities
are soteriological in nature. There are a number of stories and songs that imply, more or
less explicitly, that Hindu, Sikh and Muslim paths to salvation are false or inferior to that
made possible through Lal Beg. A representative example is a song transcribed in Sialkot
District, in which a Lal Begi ancestor petitions God:
Hindus forbid my approach
Muslims refuse to bless my dead
Listen, O God
I want to form my own nation [ummat]9
20 God assures the sufferer, by means of a letter delivered by Lal Beg, that:
On the Day of Judgment [qayāmat]
Only you will be blessed […]
The partisans of Ram and Rahim
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Will be scattered
When the sun sinks to a length-and-a-quarter
I will send them to Hell [dozakh]
To you I will show Paradise [bihisht] 
Which I have built beyond
Into this Paradise [bihisht] 
Your nation [ummat] will swiftly enter10
21 Here  the  Lal  Begi  tradition  enunciates  a  soteriological  claim neither  ambiguous  nor
inchoate—as the axioms of subaltern religions are often represented to be—but all too
clear: on the Day of Judgment, it is the long-suffering Lal Begis, beloved of God, who will
attain paradise, while their earthly oppressors, here specified as Hindus and Muslims, will
suffer in hell.
22 Before the movement to adopt Valmiki spread across north India, there is scant evidence
for what the naming practices of the sanitation labour castes were—at least in terms of
personal  names.  From  the  family  histories  that  I  collected  in  Lucknow  and  its
surrounding districts, it is clear that musalmānā names predominated for both women
and men in that region until the middle of the 20th century. Valmikis today sometimes
attribute  their  grandparents’  Muslim-styled  names  to  the  mimetic  tactics  already
mentioned—the adoption of the outward practices of the locally dominant group, jaisā
rājā  vaisī  prajā (as  the  king,  so  the  people).  And indeed Awadh was a  region with a
relatively  high  proportion  of  Muslim  landowners  (Nevill 1904,  Hasan 2007).  But  this
explanation does not hold for other parts of north India: there is some evidence that
musalmānā names were common among the sanitation labour castes in the Shimla area
(Bhagwan Das, personal communication) and ‘Muslim names like Akbur, Jamal, Multan,
Data Deen, Aladeen, etc.’ were the norm among ‘Bhangis’ until about 1930 in Jodhpur,
another place lacking a significant Muslim landowning presence (Shyamlal 1984: 30). I
would venture that before the Valmiki movement, personal names among the sanitation
labour castes reflected the Islamicate world of the Lal Begi liturgy at least as much as it
mirrored the naming practices of the locally dominant caste.
23 There is one more name that we must introduce. In Lucknow two of the sanitation labour
castes of north India predominate: Chuhras (in the cantonment, the old city, and north of
the Gomti) and Dhanuks (in the city’s western and southern quarters).  The two have
followed different identitarian trajectories and in this article I am discussing only the
former. Most of the Chuhras of Lucknow belong to a group known as the Pāñch Sau Tirāsī—
the 583. The 583 are a regional clan (the usual word is the Arabic qabīla:  ‘tribe; clan;
family’ [Platts 2000: 788]) or unit of self-governance (panchāyat) of the Chuhra caste in
Awadh.  There are other such regional  clans in central  UP—the Hazara (Thousand)  of
Mahmoudabad and the Bāra Ghar (Twelve Houses) of Sitapur, for example—but the 583
constitute by far the largest clan in Awadh. Their traditional territory stretches between
the Gomti  and the Ghaghra rivers  from Sitapur in the northwest  to Faizabad in the
southeast: the better part of six administrative districts. At the geographical center of
this territory stands Dewa Sharif, a complex of Sufi shrines in Bara Banki district where
the 583, until quite recently, convened meetings of the panchayat or caste council. The
583 trace the origins of this institution to one Jumma Mehtarani, a sagacious (dimāghdār)
ancestress whose strategic dealings with her royal employers won the caste concrete
benefits in land, patronage and protection. Some say she came from Iran or accompanied
Babur’s Mughal army; others place her centuries later, as an accomplice of Begum Hazrat
Mahal, the queen of Awadh known for sponsoring the insurgents against the British in
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the  great  rebellion  of  1857.  Other  than  their  unique  foremother,  the  583  have
traditionally  distinguished  themselves  from  their  caste  fellows  in  other  regions  by
various occupational and dietary practices, several of which relate to swine: in addition to
sanitation  work,  the  583,  unlike  the  Chuhra  caste  elsewhere,  rear  and  trade  mules,
donkeys and horses, and do not rear or sell swine. Nor do they eat pig flesh, whereas in
many parts of north India the consumption of pork is central to Chuhra ritual life. Lastly
—and this is to get ahead of the story—the 583 are known today for their continuing
attachment to the old ways. If there remains a bastion of the once-ubiquitous Lal Begi
tradition in north India, it is in Lucknow and the villages of Awadh.
24 Having introduced our protagonists, let us now turn to how they came to be renamed.
 
Lal Beg versus Valmiki, Deg versus Bhagaunā
25 In Lucknow and its hinterland, it was largely the first generation of Congress MLAs and
MPs11 from the sanitation labour castes, most of whom were also Arya Samajists, who led
the movement among their caste fellows to abandon Lal Beg and adopt Valmiki from 1947
onward. They convened meetings in the bastīs of Lucknow where they performed bhajans
of their own composition and pressed their caste fellows to reform. Munnu, a sanitation
workers’ union leader who witnessed such performances in his childhood, recalled to me
the reformists’ message in this way:
Munnu: ‘Abandon all of these bad habits. Our guru is Valmiki ji. Adopt him [unko
apnā lo]… Be Hindus, become Hindus, remain Hindus.’
Joel: Wait, was it ‘become Hindus’ or ‘remain Hindus’?
Munnu: ‘Become.’
Joel: Become?
Munnu: ‘Become.’ Yes. ‘And if you become Hindu then you will get benefits. From
the government you will get this, you will get that.’ The government certainly took
care of them! Made them MLAs and MLCs12… They also talked about Gandhi, ‘Gandhi
did this, Gandhi did that.’ There was a lot about Gandhi and Valmiki… ‘Quit these
dirty  habits,  study,  educate  your  children,  quit  drinking  liquor,  don’t  do  bad
things,’ they said all this… ‘Don’t convert to Islam, caste brothers! Don’t do all this,
don’t keep Muslim names, otherwise you won’t get reservations, you won’t get any
government benefits,’ this is what they said. ‘It’s government policy.’
26 The sardonic edge to Munnu’s remarks is not unrepresentative. Many in the community
were put off by the wholesale criticism of tradition put forward by the young, Congress-
backed, aspiring caste leaders. One of the reformists’ best-remembered verses—authored,
significantly, by a non-583 from the cantonment—was this:
Lal Begi nām chhoṛo, rishiyoṅ kī santān ho
(Abandon the name Lal Begi, you are the descendants of sages)
27 Here Valmiki (the sage referred to) was figured in contrastive opposition to Lal Beg; the
reformers held that to embrace Valmiki as the caste progenitor was, perforce, to abandon
allegiance to Lal  Beg.  In response to this  hectoring refrain,  quipsters among the 583
composed verses of their own that inverted the attack and ridiculed Valmiki and his
advocates. For example:
Netwā āye, netwā āye, hamkā jhāṇṭ mīki batāran
(‘Leaders’ have come, ‘leaders’ have come, they’re saying our pubic hairs are ‘mīki’)
28 Mīki is a nonsense word that, conjoined with jhāṇṭ (pubic hair), rhymes with Valmiki. The
quip thus corrupts and parodies the speech of the reformists; their oft-repeated phrase
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‘You all are not Lal Begi, you are Balmiki’ becomes ‘You are not Lal Begi, your pubic hair is
mīki.’ I heard several versions of this witticism from elderly interlocutors on both sides of
the reformist divide.
29 Undeterred, the advocates of Valmiki continued their efforts. As one of the reformists
himself told me, ‘What we preached [prachār karte the] was Hinduism [Hinduat]. Meaning:
‘You all are Hindu, you should do the circumambulations [a Hindu wedding rite], you
should celebrate nuptials with Hindu rites and practices [Hindu rasm-rivāj se śādī kareṅ].’’
30 Weddings  became  one  of  the  primary  sites  of  conflict  between  the  traditional  583
leadership and the reformists. Everything was fought over: what rites to perform, whom
to invite, what food to prepare, whether or not to serve liquor, whether or not to have the
fātiha (Quranic  prayers)  recited  over  the  meal,  and  so  on.  Symbolically  the  conflict
crystallized into the struggle between the deg and the bhagaunā.  Both are large metal
cauldrons used for cooking over an open fire; the only necessary structural distinction is
that  degs  are  rounded whereas  bhagaunās  are  cylindrical  with a  flat  bottom.  But  for
complicated  reasons  the  deg has  come  to  represent  ‘Muslim’  cooking  whereas  the
bhagaunā is taken to be a ‘Hindu’ vessel. In Lucknow the Lal Begis had long used degs to
prepare their wedding meals because Muslims willingly rented them out (or sometimes
lent them for free), whereas Hindus refused to allow the sanitation labour castes use of
bhagaunās even when they could pay. With the arrival of Valmiki, though, the reformists
began to rail against the use of the deg at weddings because the Hindus they had begun to
invite to their weddings (friends in the Congress and Arya Samaj) would not eat food
prepared  in  a  deg—even  if  the  dish  were  vegetarian.  The  reformists  established  a
cooperative (within the caste) for wedding equipment—bhagaunās and cooking utensils—
from which members could borrow when the occasion arose.  They began to boycott
weddings (and funerals) at which degs were used or the fātiha recited. Rancour ensued,
divisions hardened, and a series of accusations and counteraccusations led to a civil case
being brought before the city magistrate, who decided in favor of the reformists. The
result, though, was not resolution but a simmering factionalism that continued to erupt
in smaller disputes every few years for decades. Degs gradually disappeared from 583
weddings,  and the fātiha is  no longer recited.  But the reformists  did not win a total
victory: even in the now-ubiquitous bhagaunās, it is not vegetarian fare, but biryani and
goat curry that continues to be cooked and served at most Valmiki weddings in Lucknow.
31 If  much of  the  contest  over  the  religious  identity  of  the  sanitation labour  castes  of
Lucknow has had an agonistic character of this kind, the change in naming practices
provides a significant contrast. More than other objects of reform, naming practices were
pragmatically linked to education; since education was widely desired in the community,
the revolution in naming practices that accompanied the admission into schools of a
generation of  sanitation labour caste  youth in  the 1950s  and 1960s  proved the least
contested aspect  of  the  reformist  project  within  the  community.  That  is  to  say,  the
destruction of Lal Beg shrines and efforts to prevent the serving of meat at weddings
incited resentment and dissention in the community to a far greater degree than the
equally  unprecedented application of  Hindu-styled  names  to  an entire  generation of
children. It is my argument that the relative ease with which this transnomination was
secured has a great deal to do with the constitutional requirement that Dalits ‘profess’
Hinduism  to  be  recognized  as  Scheduled  Caste—the  post-independence  regime  of
recognition that Dieter Conrad (2007: 216) has called ‘legal Hindutva.’
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Jagdish, son of Ahmad
Shuru mai merā nām muslim thā. [Originally my
name was Muslim.]
32 This  utterance,  or  a  variation on it  (usually  musalmānā rather  than muslim),  was  so
frequently given voice in my interviews with Lucknow Valmikis born before the 1980s
that I learned to expect it. Many stories of renaming that I heard resonated with that of
Rishi Kumar, a poet, song-writer and retired hospital sanitation worker born in the 1940s:
Rishi Kumar: Originally my name was Muslim. Hasanu. That was the name I was
given at first […]
Joel: Your parents, sisters, brothers, everyone called you by this name?
Rishi Kumar: Earlier they called me by this name. Now everyone knows me as Rishi
Kumar.
Joel: Did you change it yourself?
Rishi Kumar: No, no, my name, in truth, changed on account of my studies. When I
was studying, that’s when my new name got written [likhā gayā].
Joel: Do you remember how it came about?
Rishi Kumar: Yes, my father had it written. My father said, ‘His name is not good. In
the future it  will  cause problems,  give him trouble.  In  studying,  in  going other
places,  it  will  cause  him  difficulties.’  So  he  renamed  me  according  to  his  own
thinking.  There  was  an  MLA,  one  Kanhaiya  Lal  Balmiki  [a  major  reformer  and
champion of the movement to embrace Valmiki].  He had a brother named Rishi
Kumar. I was renamed after him. […] My name was changed in 1955. It was when
my name was recorded at school. When admissions happened, the form was filled,
at the time of filling the form my name was written as Rishi Kumar.
33 Rishi Kumar was not singled out for this treatment. His parents changed their names as
well:
My father’s original name was Rahim. Later, when we came here from the village,
he took the name Ram Das. […] My mother’s name was Hafiza, but afterward it was
changed to Ganga […] because it would be difficult for her to go to temples; when
she would say ‘My name is Hafiza,’ they wouldn’t easily let her enter the temple.
34 The nominative practices of virtually the entire 583 clan transformed between the late
1940s and the 1970s. With regard to his mother, Rishi Kumar mentions the ‘difficulty’ [
dikkat]  of  entering  Hindu  temples  bearing  an  apparently  Muslim  moniker.  This  is
relatively rarely cited as a factor in transnomination,  though it  is  worth noting that
names did function as one of many signs of Lal Begi alterity from Hindus in the old order.
A more common context for adopting hinduānā names was the obtaining of government
employment. In many accounts, women and men changed their names precisely when
they applied for positions as sanitation workers in the municipality, at the university, or
in government hospitals. Rishi Kumar hints at this when he remarks that Rahim became
Ram Das ‘when we came here from the village.’ For his parents, as for many of the 583
who urbanized in the middle decades of the 20th century, leaving the village and joining
government service were simultaneous, almost coterminous, events. Relatives or caste
fellows who had migrated to Lucknow earlier and already held government jobs advised
them to apply for work with hinduānā names. Having musalmānā names, especially in the
years  immediately  following  independence  and  partition,  was  seen  as  a  liability,  a
potential source of ‘difficulty’ [dikkat] or ‘trouble’ [pareśānī], for fourth class employees in
government  departments  where  anti-Muslim  sentiment  sometimes  ran  unchecked.
Transnomination at the moment of securing government employment was, for a period,
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so widespread that it gave rise to the term ‘sarvis nām’ [service name], the hinduānā name
used for employment purposes, as distinct from ‘ghar kā  nām’  [home name], the often
musalmānā name used among family and community.
35 More than any other, though, it was the context of Rishi Kumar’s own renaming—school
admission—that  prevailed  in  my  interlocutors’  accounts.  The  reformists  consistently
stressed  the  practical  value  of  the  adoption  of  hinduānā names—both  given  names/
forenames and the surname Valmiki—in securing admission to government schools and
exemption from school fees. Education, and the governmental financial assistance that
brought education potentially within reach, were themes rarely absent from the appeals
the reformists made to their caste fellows.  As the reformer Lalta Prasad put it,  their
message  had  as  its  refrain  the  following:  ‘Brothers,  we  people  are  not  Lal  Begi  but
Balmiki.  We should  write  ‘Balmiki’  [as  our  surname].  And by  doing this  we will  get
exemptions from fees, our daughters and sons will get fee exemptions. If we write ‘Lal
Begi’  then  they  will  not  get  scholarships  and  fee  exemptions.’  He  then  described  a
particular incident from around 1960:
I had this friend. There was a Gitā Vidyālāy [a government-supported school in our
neighbourhood, run by prominent local Congressmen]. They had a column on the
application for admission asking what your religion is. Isn’t it? So my friend wrote
‘Lal Begi.’ He submitted the forms. Then [the admissions officer] said ‘Kindly pay
the full fees.’ My friend replied, ‘Why?’ So [the admissions officer] said, ‘You are Lal
Begi, Muslim. Therefore you will have to pay full fees.’ So he came and told me
about it,  and told Govind Prasad,  and we advised him, ‘You’ve made a mistake,
bring the forms to us, we’ll fill out a new one.’ So the second form we filled out, and
we wrote ‘Balmiki’ and in brackets ‘Hindu.’ Meaning Scheduled Caste. […] Then he
did not have to pay fees.
36 Awareness  of  the  legal  recognition of  the  category  of  Scheduled  Caste,  and of  state
programs designed to address caste-based inequality by creating educational and other
opportunities for Scheduled Castes, arrived in the bastīs of Lucknow piecemeal in the
years after the Constitution took effect. Lalta Prasad’s friend knew that under Congress
rule,  his caste status should entitle his children to a fee exemption in school,  yet he
remained unaware of  the religious exclusions that  qualified that  entitlement.  Having
naively identified himself according to his community’s traditional self-description—as
Lal Begi by religion—he found himself confronted by a legal regime for which the de facto
autonomy of Dalit religion was illegible. That is, he experienced locally the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order: professing a religion ‘different from the Hindu religion,’ he was
not ‘deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.’ The admissions officer—the local face
of the state—understood Lal Begis to be Muslim, or at least to be more akin to Muslims
than to the other recognized religious communities, and accordingly declared the family
ineligible for financial relief. Since even modest school fees were beyond the means of
Lalta Prasad’s friend—as they were for most sanitation labour caste families—securing his
children’s education meant formally relocating his family vis-à-vis the state’s regime of
recognition. It meant becoming—or at least professing to be—Hindu.
37 Gauhar Lal, born in 1939, a retired government accountant and one of the most highly
educated members of the community in his generation, told the following story of his
own experience in accessing education at a government school in Lucknow:
I filled out the scholarship form for intermediate [eleventh and twelfth standard].
On the  form,  for  religion,  for  caste  I  wrote  Mehtar.  And I  was  disqualified13 for
scholarship. I didn’t get it. They said, ‘This is not allowed.’ So the principal called
me and said, ‘You’ve written Mehtar as your caste, why didn’t you write Balmiki?’ I
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said, ‘What is Balmiki? I don’t know Balmiki.’ He said, ‘This has been recognized, from
the government  this  has  been already recognized,  that  only  Balmikis  will  obtain
scholarships.’  So  I  got  a  magistrate—an acquaintance—to make out  a  certificate
saying ‘Now I am Balmiki.’ […] So when I got the Balmiki certificate, and again sent
the form, then I got the scholarship.
38 Such stories were legion. Sometimes only the children’s surname or title was changed
(from Lal Begi or Mehtar to Balmiki), other times the given name was changed as well.
Not infrequently, the parents changed their names at the same time, in order to avoid
scrutiny  by  admissions  staff,  or  embarrassment  to  their  children,  on account  of  the
mixture of musalmānā and hinduānā names in the same family. Ratan Lal ‘Sadhu’ (born in
1948), for instance, told me that:
When I went to school, one of our community leaders said to me, ‘Your father’s
name is Ali. This will not do, your classmates will laugh at you […] So in place of Ali,
write  Alok Nath.’  […]  So then—my father’s  real  name [aslī  nām]  is  Ali—then for
school papers I wrote that my father’s name was Alok Nath. And to this day he’s
known as Alok Nath.
 
Conclusion
39 If the above account appears to take a narrowly instrumentalist view of the politics of the
Valmiki movement in Lucknow, it is because so many of the women and men who related
to me the stories of their and their families’ renaming emphasized precisely this aspect.
Not every front in the Hinduizing campaign looked like this: the efforts to encourage
vegetarianism, to discourage the rites of Lal Beg, and to introduce cremation instead of
burial, for example, made less frequent reference to the state and fewer direct appeals to
calculations of self-interest, though the latter were by no means absent. As the case of the
degs and bhagaunās was meant to illustrate, these and other domains of reform were also
more hotly contested, and remain divisive issues in the community today.
40 But while meat remains popular at Balmiki weddings in Lucknow, burial continues to vie
with cremation, and the rites of Lal Beg persist (albeit in increasingly secretive forms),
the Islamicate repertoire of personal names with which the community formerly named
its children, and the title Lal Begi itself, have virtually disappeared. In no other sphere of
the Valmiki movement have the advocates of Hinduization achieved a more complete
success. As we have seen, this had partly to do with the advantage hinduānā names gave
their  bearers  in obtaining jobs  in the municipality and in government hospitals  and
universities  in  the  years  following  Partition—a  consequence,  in  other  words,  of  the
normalization of anti-Muslim sentiment in the Congress administrations in UP and in
Lucknow city government. This gives further support to the contention of Prashad and
Jaoul  that  municipalities  operated as  crucial  sites for the induction of  the sanitation
labour castes into the project of Hindu majoritarianism.
41 Even more than employment, though, we have seen that it was access to education that
decisively influenced naming practices in the accounts of Lucknow Balmikis. This reveals
a dimension of the political engineering of subaltern Hinduization hitherto neglected in
the analysis of the Valmiki movement, and the literature on the postcolonial politics of
caste and religion more broadly. The religiously exclusionary definition of the Scheduled
Castes  inscribed  into  law  by  the  Constitution  (Scheduled  Caste)  Order  of  1950—a
postcolonial echo of the Poona Pact—effectively brought into being a raft of powerful
material  incentives  for  Dalits  to  ‘profess’  to  be  Hindu,  chief  among  them  being
Jagdish, Son of Ahmad: Dalit Religion and Nominative Politics in Lucknow
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 11 | 2015
13
scholarships  and  student  fee  exemptions.  In  the  Congress  dispensation  of  the  1950s
onward, Ahmad and Ayesha had to become Ganesh and Gayatri to afford schooling.
42 Nominative politics, however, cut both ways. If the 1950 Order and the de facto policies of
Congress municipal administrations ushered in a wave of transnomination and produced
a  generation  of  apparently  Hindu  youth,  these  conversions  were  not  without  their
clandestine  continuities.  Recall  the  frank  instrumentalism of  Ratan  Lal  ‘Sadhu,’  who
appreciated the ‘profit that accrued to us upon becoming Hindu,’ as well as his equally
unguarded remark, ‘my father’s real name [aslī nām] is Ali.’ When the sanitation labour
caste tradition of ‘undergoing protective discolouration’ is taken into account, the very
ease with which the revolution in names was secured casts doubt on the nature of this
apparent triumph of the Hindu majoritarian project.
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NOTES
1. All  names of  persons in Lucknow in this  article have been changed—though the apparent
‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’ character of the names is carefully retained—to protect the identity of my
informants.  The  only  exceptions  are  public  persons  (the  Member  of  Legislative  Assembly
Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki) and the late reformers Lalta Prasad (1923–2014) and Govind Prasad (1926–
2013),  who requested,  in  our  many interviews,  to  be  named.  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  all
quotes are from recorded interviews conducted in Lucknow between February 2011 and May
2012 in Hindi/Urdu, and the English presented here is my translation of the same, with key terms
provided in brackets.
2. As C.S. Adcock (2014: 14) rightly notes, ‘the premise, now enshrined in the Constitution of
India and in much common-sense understanding, that Untouchables are Hindu by religion… was
put in place with the agreement between Gandhi and Ambedkar in 1932.’ See also Conrad 2007:
198 and Lee 2015:Ch. IV.
3. The only caste categories that are more frequently mentioned than ‘Bhangi’ in the index of
Gandhi’s Collected Works are ‘Harijan’ and ‘Brahman.’
4. There has been a host of critical engagements with Srinivas’s concept over the last sixty years;
for our purposes a few of the relevant critiques include Tambiah 1967, Lynch 1969, Guru 1984,
and Roberts 2008.
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5. Julahas adopted Islam in great numbers in the Sultanate and Mughal periods, becoming the
single largest occupational Muslim caste of north India; Jats on a similar scale became Muslim
and Sikh. See Ibbetson 1970, Eaton 1982.
6. Thus the first part of his famous declaration of the intention to convert: ‘I was born a Hindu.’
7. In Greeven’s (1894: 43, 48) transliteration, Hindu ka dehra, Mussulman ki masjid; main sewun teri
kachchhi marhei. At this point in the song, the speaker is ‘Ali and his addressee is Lal Beg.
8. In Youngson’s transliteration, Jon Hindu Ganga nu parsann/ Jon Makka Mussalmanan/ Shahi nam
tere nu nun mannan/ Pind pind than banavan. Youngson translates the passage thus: ‘The Ganges
Hindus fear, and Muslims make their weary pilgrimage to Mecca far, but thee the Shahis love and
build to thee unnumbered shrines o’er all the crowded land.’ (Youngson 1906: 343)
9. Youngson’s transliteration of the original oral text is: 
Mainun Hindu na nere aun denge/ Mussalman na parhnge janaza/ Tu sun Khuda raja/ Main ummat
rakhna chahunan.
10. Youngson’s transliteration:
Roz Qiyamat waqt de/ Tainun milegi vadiai […]/ Ram te Rahim kian/ Chhap chhap jana/ Sava neze te din
avega/ Haoe dozakh pana/ Par bihisht banake/ Samne vikhana/ Ummat teri bhajjke/Bihishti var jana.
(Youngson 1906: 350–51)
11. MLA: Member of Legislative Assembly. MP: Member of Parliament.
12. MLC: Member of Legislative Council.
13. In this passage italics are used to indicate English words in Gauhar Lal’s otherwise Hindi
remarks.
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